



European Organisation for Strategic Policy

POLICY PAPER

European Defence Readiness 2030: From Spending Pledges to Deployable Capability

A delivery framework for converting higher expenditure into forces, industrial depth and civil resilience.

Research Directorate - European Organisation for Strategic Policy August 2026 Public edition

INSTITUTIONAL NOTE

About this publication

Europe's defence credibility will be determined less by announced expenditure than by whether governments can field interoperable formations, replenish stocks, protect enabling infrastructure and sustain readiness through a prolonged crisis.

A delivery framework for converting higher expenditure into forces, industrial depth and civil resilience.

Publication responsibility

Prepared by the Research Directorate. This public edition is intended for policy discussion. It does not represent a governmental position and does not disclose confidential dialogue or attribute views to participants.

Method and evidentiary standard

The paper separates verified institutional evidence from analytical judgement, identifies important uncertainties and frames recommendations as options whose implementation depends on mandate, capacity and timing.

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Executive assessment

Europe's defence challenge is now principally one of conversion: turning resources and political urgency into usable, sustained capability.

The policy direction is clearer than it was several years ago. European institutions and governments have elevated readiness, industrial capacity and joint action. The implementation risk is that expenditure, procurement announcements and production targets are treated as substitutes for operational effect.

A readiness system should begin with missions and formations. Authorities need to know which units can deploy, with what command arrangements, for how long, and with which dependencies on transport, maintenance, medical

support, communications, cyber defence and host-nation infrastructure.

The proposed framework uses a limited number of capability lines, quarterly evidence reviews and protected escalation. It does not require sensitive details to be published, but it does require leaders to see where ambition exceeds the verified ability to deliver.

- Adopt mission-based baselines before approving additional headline targets.
- Fund stocks, spares, repair and logistics as operational capability.
- Use common standards and exercises to identify integration failures early.

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Scope and analytical method

This paper proposes a decision framework for converting European defence ambition into formations, stocks, enablers and infrastructure that can be used together and sustained. It complements the EU readiness agenda with an implementation and accountability lens.

The paper uses a structured review of official European Union, national and international-institution material, combined with scenario analysis and an implementation test. Claims are assessed against three questions: what is formally decided, what can be delivered with existing authorities and resources, and what would require further political agreement. Recommendations are designed for ministerial, diplomatic and senior-policy audiences.

Open-source analysis cannot assess classified force readiness or national operational plans. The framework therefore avoids unsupported country rankings and focuses on governance, procurement and capability tests that can be used inside secure national and multinational processes.

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What readiness means

A force is ready only when its people, equipment, support and decision authorities work as a system.

Readiness is often reduced to personnel numbers or equipment availability. Both matter, but neither captures the chain required to generate and sustain military effect. A platform without trained crews, secure communications, ammunition, maintenance and movement permissions is an accounting asset rather than an operational capability.

The unit of analysis should therefore be the formation or mission package. For each assigned task, planners should assess notice-to-move, command integration, transport, protection, sustainment, medical support and replacement capacity.

This approach also clarifies burden-sharing. Contributions can be compared by the effect they enable rather than by a single spending ratio. Smaller states may provide critical logistics, cyber, medical, air-defence or host-nation functions.

Layer	Core question	Evidence
Formation	Can it deploy for the assigned mission?	Personnel, training, equipment and command

Layer	Core question	Evidence
Sustainment	Can it remain effective?	Stocks, repair, medical and replacement flow
Integration	Can it operate with allies?	Standards, data, communications and exercises
Infrastructure	Can it move and be protected?	Ports, rail, roads, energy and host support

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The conversion gap

The critical delay sits between political approval and fielded capability.

New funding does not immediately generate readiness. Requirements must be agreed, contracts placed, production scheduled, facilities expanded, people recruited and trained, systems integrated and units exercised. Delay in one stage can postpone the effect of the whole programme.

Governments should map this chain for priority capabilities and distinguish constraints that money can solve from those requiring regulatory, industrial or workforce action. Production may depend on specialised inputs; infrastructure upgrades may face permitting; recruitment may be limited by housing or training capacity.

A senior delivery review should track the few constraints that determine programme timing. It should protect commercial information while showing whether milestones are credible, which decisions are late and who can resolve them.

- Publish aggregate schedule confidence for priority programmes.
- Create cross-government teams for permitting, workforce and input bottlenecks.
- Tie final payments to integration, training, spares and support outcomes.

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Industrial capacity and procurement discipline

Industrial expansion should be governed by predictable demand, interoperable requirements and credible delivery schedules.

Industry needs demand visibility to invest in capacity, but long-term signals must be matched by contract discipline. Divergent national requirements, changing quantities and late political decisions can reduce the value of additional finance.

Priority should go to areas where common demand improves availability and replenishment: ammunition, air and missile defence, secure communications, logistics, maintenance and selected unmanned systems. Standardisation should include interfaces, data and support.

Supply security requires a realistic view of dependencies. A product labelled European may still rely on a narrow source for components, materials or software. Contracts should identify critical inputs, alternatives and substitution plans.

- Aggregate demand before specifications harden into incompatible variants.
- Require critical-dependency and recovery plans from suppliers.
- Measure delivery in operationally accepted units, not contracts announced.

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Military mobility and protected infrastructure

Readiness fails if forces cannot move, communicate, refuel and repair across borders.

Movement across Europe depends on civilian ports, rail, roads, bridges, customs and energy systems. Legal permissions and technical limits can be as consequential as equipment availability. A readiness review must include infrastructure and administrative movement time.

Dual-use assets create protection obligations. Cyber incidents, sabotage, power failure or physical damage could affect several sectors simultaneously. Authorities should identify the routes and nodes that support priority missions, assess redundancy and exercise recovery.

Host-nation arrangements should be practical documents with tested contact points, data-sharing rules and resource assumptions. Exercises should include the legal and commercial actors who control movement.

- Set corridor-level movement-time targets and test them.
- Prioritise dual-use investments by operational consequence and recovery time.
- Maintain secure cross-border contact lists and authorities.

07 / ANALYSIS

People, training and command

Equipment growth without trained personnel and trusted command relationships creates hollow readiness.

European forces face competition for technical skills, retention challenges, reserve readiness and the need for training capacity that keeps pace with new equipment. Personnel plans should be connected to procurement schedules from the start.

Multinational effectiveness depends on repeated training and clear command arrangements. Interoperability must be observed under realistic conditions, including degraded communications, casualties, logistics disruption and ambiguous information.

After-action reporting should ensure that procurement and policy authorities receive the lessons. Findings that remain inside exercise communities do not improve the next contract or infrastructure decision.

- Link equipment milestones to crew, maintainer and instructor pipelines.
- Treat reserve mobilisation and civilian skill access as readiness functions.
- Route exercise findings into funded corrective action.

08 / ANALYSIS

A readiness governance model

Governance should connect classified operational evidence to procurement, budgets and political choices.

The proposed model has three layers. A secure operational layer verifies formations and dependencies. A delivery layer tracks procurement, infrastructure and workforce action. A political layer resolves trade-offs and accepts risk.

EU and NATO processes should reinforce one another while respecting distinct mandates and memberships. National authorities remain decisive for forces and budgets; European instruments can reduce fragmentation and strengthen industrial coordination.

Public accountability can be maintained through aggregate readiness bands, milestone performance and independent audit of process quality, without exposing operational vulnerabilities.

Layer	Owner	Output
Operational	Military authorities	Mission and formation readiness judgement
Delivery	Defence, industry and infrastructure teams	Schedule, dependencies and corrections
Political	Ministers and heads of government	Risk acceptance and resource decisions

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Implementation roadmap to 2030

The path to 2030 should be organised around verified capability increments, not a single end-date promise.

The first phase should establish baselines, prioritise mission sets and remove consequential administrative barriers. The second should demonstrate integrated capability through exercises and accepted deliveries. The final phase should consolidate replenishment, replacement and adaptation.

Milestones should be difficult to game. A programme should not be described as delivered until it includes trained users, support arrangements, secure integration and agreed operational acceptance. Corrective action should be funded and assigned.

Phase	Focus	Proof point
2026-2027	Baselines and bottlenecks	Mission-level gaps and owners agreed
2027-2028	Integration and capacity	Accepted deliveries and exercised formations
2029-2030	Sustainment and adaptation	Replenishment, repair and learning demonstrated

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Recommendations

Ten disciplined actions can improve readiness without creating another layer of strategy.

The recommendations align political oversight, operational evidence and industrial delivery. They should be adapted to national constitutional arrangements and to the respective roles of the EU and NATO.

- Define priority mission packages and verify their full dependency chains.
- Establish quarterly secure readiness reviews linked to budgets and contracts.
- Ring-fence stocks, repair, medical, transport, communications and infrastructure.
- Aggregate demand and reduce unnecessary national variants.
- Build critical-input and supplier recovery clauses into procurement.
- Exercise movement permissions, host support and infrastructure recovery.
- Align personnel and training pipelines with equipment delivery.
- Give exercise findings a funded corrective-action process.
- Publish aggregate milestone performance without exposing vulnerabilities.
- Conduct an independent 2028 review to reset final 2030 priorities.

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Sources and further reading

The analysis prioritises official institutional material and current primary sources. Links were checked during the final editorial review.

- European Commission - White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 | https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc0-3867b4373019_en?filename=White+paper+for+European+defence+%E2%80%93+Readiness+2030.pdf
- Council of the EU - European defence readiness | <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-defence-readiness/>
- Council of the EU - Timeline: European defence readiness | <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-defence-readiness/timeline-european-defence-readiness/>

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Editorial standard

This paper distinguishes verified facts from analytical judgement. Recommendations are framed as options for public authorities and institutional partners, not as representations of a government or of participants in confidential dialogue.