Open Strategic Autonomy: Reducing Critical Dependencies Without Closing Europe

Executive judgement

European economic security should protect a limited set of essential functions with exceptional seriousness while preserving openness, competition and trusted international exchange everywhere else.

Key findings

• Concentration becomes strategic risk when disruption can disable an essential function or deny public authorities time to respond.
• Indiscriminate self-sufficiency would weaken European competitiveness and the alliances on which resilience depends.
• A common dependency register and timed stress tests are prerequisites for proportionate intervention.
• Diversification partnerships should create durable value in supplier countries rather than reproduce extractive dependence.

From vulnerability to function

The policy debate often begins with a list of foreign dependencies. It should begin with the European function at risk. A concentrated supply relationship is strategically significant when its interruption could disable energy, defence, health, communications, transport or public administration; when substitution would take longer than the political decision window; or when a supplier could exploit the dependency coercively. This functional test prevents economic security from becoming an unlimited protectionist licence.

A three-tier doctrine

Tier one covers essential functions and requires minimum stocks, tested substitutes, repair capacity and trusted supply agreements. Tier two covers costly but manageable disruption and should rely on supplier diversity, transparent ownership and contingency contracts. Tier three encompasses normal commercial exchange and should remain governed by predictable rules. Measures in every tier require review and sunset clauses so that emergency controls do not become permanent barriers without evidence.

Data, stress tests and responsibility

A shared dependency register should connect customs data, corporate supply maps, beneficial ownership, infrastructure exposure and recovery time. Selected chains should be tested against 30-, 90- and 180-day interruption scenarios. The exercise must identify the lead authority and the point at which private contingency becomes a public responsibility. Confidential corporate information can be protected while aggregate vulnerabilities and remedial milestones are published.

Partnerships as resilience

Diversification cannot be reduced to buying the same inputs from a different external supplier. Europe needs agreements that support processing, skills, standards, infrastructure and transparent revenue in partner countries. Such arrangements widen political support, reduce concentration and create relationships that are more durable under pressure. The strategic aim is not isolation but a larger number of credible options.

Decision rules for exceptional intervention

Economic-security measures are credible only when authorities can explain why a dependency is strategic, why ordinary market adjustment is insufficient and how the intervention will end.

A decision file should identify the essential European function at risk, the likely interruption period, available substitutes and the authority responsible for continuity. It should also record the distributional consequences: a measure that protects one industry may raise costs for another, transfer risk to a partner or reduce incentives for private diversification. These effects do not invalidate intervention, but they must be visible before a decision is taken.

Proportionality requires a ladder of options. Better information, supplier engagement, standards cooperation, contingency contracts and joint purchasing may reduce exposure before subsidies, screening or export controls are considered. Where restrictive instruments are necessary, review dates and measurable exit conditions should be fixed at adoption. Parliamentary and public reporting can protect legitimacy without disclosing commercially sensitive data.

• Require a written essential-function and recovery-time test for every exceptional measure.
• Publish aggregate costs, milestones and review dates while protecting firm-level data.
• Consult affected partners early enough to create diversification rather than displacement.

Implementation sequence

The practical sequence is register, stress test, diversify, contract and review.

During the first six months, authorities should agree a protected vocabulary for dependencies and nominate lead institutions. Selected supply chains should then be tested under common interruption scenarios. The resulting gaps should be assigned either to companies, national authorities or European instruments, with deadlines and funding routes. An annual independent review should test whether concentration, substitution time and repair capacity have actually improved.

• Start with a limited number of functions whose interruption would have cross-border effects.
• Link financial support to verified diversification, capacity or recovery outcomes.

Policy recommendations

1. Adopt a common EU test for strategic concentration based on essential functions and recovery time.
2. Create a protected European dependency register with public aggregate reporting.
3. Run cross-border stress tests for selected materials, digital services and infrastructure.
4. Use joint purchasing where fragmented demand weakens security or bargaining power.
5. Attach review, proportionality and sunset clauses to exceptional economic-security measures.

Indicators to watch

• Single-supplier exposure above agreed thresholds
• Substitution time beyond 180 days
• Foreign control of repair or software access
• Retaliatory escalation against open trade

Scope and analytical method

A risk-based economic security doctrine for materials, technologies and infrastructure. The paper tests the issue against institutional authority, delivery capacity, political sustainability and the interests of affected partners. It separates confirmed developments from interpretation and identifies the conditions under which recommendations would need to change.

The analysis is based on a structured review of official institutional material and current primary sources. It distinguishes formal decisions and verified facts from institutional assessment and forward-looking judgement. Recommendations are tested against authority, delivery capacity, timing, political sustainability and the interests of external partners.

Public sources cannot capture classified readiness data, commercially sensitive contracting information or confidential diplomatic exchanges. Time-sensitive figures and legal developments should therefore be refreshed by responsible authorities before an operational decision is taken.

Sources and method

The sources below establish the public evidentiary basis for this paper. Interpretation and recommendations remain the responsibility of the Research Directorate. Principal public sources:

• European Commission, European Critical Raw Materials Act
• European Commission, Economic security measures